Nina Doreen Davis Boyce v. Milan Mack Boyce : Reply to Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1979
Nina Doreen Davis Boyce v. Milan Mack Boyce :
Reply to Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
David S. Dolowitz; Jed W. Shields; Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent;
R. M. Child; Donovan C. Snyder; Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant;
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Boyce v. Boyce, No. 16342 (Utah Supreme Court, 1979).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/1661
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
NINA DOREEN DAVIS BOYCE, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, No. 16342 
v. 
MILAN MACK BOYCE, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
DAVID S. DOL01JITZ 
Parsons, Behle, & Latimer 
79 South State Street 
R. M. CHILD 
DONOVAN C. SNYDER 
Bayle, Child & Ritchie 
P. 0. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
1300 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
JED H. SHIELDS 
243 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attornevs for Defendant-
Respondent 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-
Appellant 
"= 
!I !I E r = J k.~-, 1_.,....,.., 
~F :'. 1979 
r1 t) 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
NINA DOREEN DAVIS BOYCE, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
MILAN MACK BOYCE, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
No. 163Lj2 
REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ 
Parsons, Behle, & Latimer 
79 South State Street 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
JED W. SHIELDS 
243 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Defendant-
Respondent 
R. M. CHILD 
DONOVAN C. SNYDER 
Bayle, Child & Ritchie 
1300 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-
Appellant 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
SUPPLEMENTARY STATEMENT OF FACTS ..... . 
ARGUMENT: 
POINT I 
THE CASE OF HANER v. HANER CITED 
BY RESPONDENT IS INAPPOSITE TO 
1 
THE CASE AT BAR. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT RULED BASED ON 
THE AFFIDAVIT OF RESPONDENT IN 
THE FACE OF DIRECT TESTIMONY 
ADDUCED IN OPEN COURT, AND TO 
DO SO WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR ........................... 6 
CONCLUSION ................................................ 11 
CASES CITED 
Haner v. Haner, 13 Utah 2nd, 373 P.2d 577 (1962) .......... 4 
d 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
NINA DOREEN DAVIS BOYCE, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
MILAN MACK BOYCE, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
No. 16342 
REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
COMES NOW Appellant in the above captioned case and 
respectfully submits this reply to Respondent's Brief. 
SUPPLEMENTARY STATEMENT OF FACTS 
I. 
On page 7 of his Brief, Respondent indicates that the 
lower Court had opened the matter for additional discovery. 
Both Appellant and Respondent have quoted from the transcript 
of the hearing of September 8, 1978, both attempting to advance 
a different position. Both Appellant and Respondent have 
attempted to cite this Court to those portions of the transcript 
each considers relevant and informative. Appellant will take 
this opportunity to supply one final quotation. 
At pages 13 and 1~ of his Brief, Respondent quotes 
from pages 787 and 788 of the record herein. Immediately 
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following the final sentence quoted by Respondent, the 
following paragraph is found: 
(BY THE COURT): Now, if you want to do 
it under any--if you want to clean up 
the record and file a proper Rule 60(b) 
motion, which is identified as such, now 
that the Court has accepted your position 
as far as the dismissal of the appeal. I 
think you ought to do that, the next step, 
just so in the event there's an appeal 
from the order which is subsequently 
entered that you have that order entered 
pursuant to an opening under 60(b). 
(R. 788) (Emphasis added.) 
Appellant respectfully submits that when the 
transcript of the Septanber 8th hearing is reviewed as a whole, 
the only conclusion that can be reached is that the trial 
court indicated that discovery could be commenced only after 
the decision was ~ade to reopen the divorce case pursuant to 
Rule 60(b), Pcoo, '~rcdent' s counsel atgued vigorously that 
discovery could not proceed until the case was so reopened, 
and it appears from the transcript of the September 8 hearing 
that the trial court agreed. 
II. 
Also, on page 7 of the Respondent's Brief is found 
the statement: 
The Court ruled that the Appellant failed 
to prove the allegations of fraud (which 
she admits on page 30 of her brief). 
(R.527-530) ... 
Respondent makes this statement based on the follow~ 
found in Appellant's Brief: 
The October 17 hearing was not intended to, 
and it did not, amount to formal proof of 
common law fraud. 
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The point being made by Appellant in this statement is that it 
was not necessary and Appellant did not attempt to put on 
full-blown proof of all of the elements of common law fraud 
to the lower court which was sitting not so much as a trial 
court as a court of equity charged by law to see that substantial 
justice was done. The only issue before the lower court was 
whether the matter should be reopened--not what damages 
Appellant may have suffered. The latter issue awaited a future 
hearing after the judgment of divorce had been set aside and 
Appellant afforded the opportunity for discovery. Respondent 
does not contend, nor could he contend, that it was necessary for 
Appellant to prove every element of common law fraud by 
preponderance of the evidence before the lower court would be 
permitted to set aside the decree of divorce. The analysis 
presented by Appellant falls far short of an admission that 
she failed to put on sufficient evidence to warrant a court of 
equity setting aside the divorce. This point is further 
buttressed by the fact that Appellant could not have demanded 
a jury in the Rule 60(b) motion, and it therefore borders on 
ludicrous to assert that her burden was to prove common law 
fraud by a preponderance of the evidence. 
III. 
On page 15 of his Brief, Respondent makes the statement: 
In paragraph twelve (12) of her Affidavit 
of January 22, 1979, entitled "Affidavit of 
Nina Doreen Davis Boyce in Response to 
Defendant's Answer and Counter Affidavit," 
Appellant states that she knew of t~e transfer 
of the corporation prior to the Apr~l 7, 1978 
hearing wherein the stipulation was entered. 
(R.571-584) (Emphasis in original.) 
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Indeed, this claimed transfer of assets impressed on Appellant 
the futility of seeking an award of an interest in this 
property. It was not until after the financial statement of 
May 1, 1978 came to light that Appellant knew that Respondent 
still considered these same assets as his own. 
following: 
A review of the affidavit referred to discloses the 
... Affiant was never informed until one or 
two days prior to April 7, 1978, of the 
claimed transfer of said corporation or its 
stock to Insulation Corporation of America 
or to Milan C. Boyce and/or Noriene Boyce. 
(R.580) 
Thus Appellant has admitted to learning of said transfer at 
most two days before the April 7 divorce hearing whereas 
according to Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 herein, the transfer 
supposedly occuy~ej on December 1, 1975. 
IV. 
At pages 14 through 20 of Respondent's Brief, 
various of Appellant's allegations of fraud are paraphrased 
and "responded to." These responses contain numerous 
misstatements which Appellant will not here attempt to point 
out but which are obvious when reference is made to the 
underlying pages of the record cited by Respondent. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE CASE OF HANER V. HANER CITED BY RESPONDENT 
IS INAPPOSITE TO THE CASE AT BAR 
Respondent cites the case of Haner v. Haner, 
13 Utah 2nd 299, 373 P.2d 577 (1962), for the proposition that 
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a decree of divorce can be set aside only for that type of 
fraud characterized as extrinsic fraud. While it is true 
that courts have generally made a distinction between intrinsic 
and extrinsic fraud in determining whether final judgments 
should be overturned, that distinction is not applicable to an 
attempt under Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to 
set aside a judgment. Subsection (3) of that Rule provides 
that a party may be relieved from a final judgment in cases of 
"fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), 
misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; ... " 
(emphasis added). 
Haner involved a "motion to set aside or modify a divorce 
decree," and no mention is made anywhere in the opinion that the 
motion was based on Rule 60(b). (13 Utah 2d at 300.) 
Even if the distinction between the two types of fraud 
could be validly made, the Supreme Court in Haner listed as an 
example of extrinsic fraud--and hence a proper ground for 
granting relief from a judgment--"making false statements or 
representations to the other party--to prevent [him] from 
contesting the issues ... " (13 Utah 2d at 301). Such false 
statements and representations are precisely the issue in the 
case at bar, and Appellant's evidence showed that such statements 
and misrepresentations effectively prevented her from contesting 
the issue of a fair and equitable property settlement. 
It is therefore respectfully submitted that Haner is 
inapposite to the case at bar. j 
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POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT RULED BASED ON THE AFFIDAVIT 
OF RESPONDENT IN THE FACE OF DIRECT TESTIMONY 
ADDUCED IN OPEN COURT, AND TO DO SO WAS 
REVERSIBLE ERROR 
Respondent maintains that the lower court based its 
decision only on the testimony adduced at the October 17 
hearing and not on the voluminous affidavit styled "Answer 
and Counter-Affidavits to Plaintiff's Affidavit in Support of 
Motion for Relief from Final Decree" or any of the other 
affidavits submitted by Respondent. A review of the 
Memorandum Decision of the lower court found at pages 527 
through 530 of the record herein reveals the following 
statement which is the only place in the record approaching 
a finding of fact: 
The Court is of the op~n~on that all the 
i~~ormation contained in the subsequent affidavit 
2nc a~~ of the allegations pro and con contained 
-~ ~ffidavits filed b~ defendant countering 
affidavits by plainti f were well-known to 
plaintiff and her competent counsel prior to 
the original Decree having been entered into 
on the 19th of May, 1978, and also prior to 
the entering into the Stipulation of the 7th day 
of April, 1978. (R.529) (Emphasis added) 
Respondent's 'Answer and Counter-Affidavits" is a 
rambling document some 180 pages in length, and contains, for 
example, the following information which the trial court 
apparently charged the Appellant with "knowing." 
(R.373) "Further, while the Defendant loved his wife 
and would have shared anv and all things 
with her had she been genuinely interested 
and wanted to know, the Defendant felt that 
he had at the same time, been cheated and 
swindled so much, so man~ times and in so 
many ways by the Plaintiff's father, the 
monitary total running into tens of thousands 
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(R.386) 
(R.392) 
(R.-+08-
409) 
-7-
of dollars, and because there had developed 
a competition and bitter jealousy and even 
a hatred between them, it is true that in 
the last year or so of marriage the Defendant 
was somewhat guarded as to what he shared 
with the Plaintiff about his business affairs. 
This was because of her lack of genuine 
interest and in lieu thereof of the second-hand 
interest of her skeeming [sic] father (whom 
the Defendant over the years grew to despise 
because of his lyings and cheatings and 
psudo-religious unfairness to the Defendant)." 
Further, after a considerable amount of therapy, 
both from the marriage counselor and the 
psychiatrist, the Defendant realized that to 
continue in this so-called marriage would be 
foolish and impossible, and that divorce would 
be better than to continue in the mental torment 
created by the Plaintiff's "sick family system." 
So, since the Plaintiff and her parents say (even 
over the objection of the Bishop and Stake 
President) that this divorce is inspired, Church-
authorized, and Priesthood approved, the Defendant 
is now after considerable marriage counseling 
and th~rapy, willing to let them (that is, the 
Plaintiff and/or her father) or even God (at some 
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future time) be the judge of that. 
The Plaintiff's father took her (the Plaintiff) 
to the law firm of Backman, Clark & Marsh, her 
initial lawyers, because he didn't like the 
attorney she had picked--if the Defendant's 
memory serves him correctly, the Plaintiff's 
father said (in the same conversation at the 
kitchen table) that it was because the attorney 
she had picked was suing him or handling some 
action against him (the Plaintiff's father, 
Wendel A. Davis) or one of the businesses he 
is affiliated with. The defendant had a note 
in which he had written the details of this 
conversation; but, (at the time of the 
preparation of this affidavit) he can not 
locate the note. But, in any event, the Defendant 
has always felt that Backman, Clark & Marsh 
was used as an unholy and improper way of 
going around the Stake President to Brother 
Backman, the Regional Representative of the 
Tweleve, who would be the next higher man in 
the Priesthood line of authority. (Prima 
facie evidence of this is the fact that after 
Brother Backman's Church assignment was changed, 
the Plaintiff changed law firms to Mr. David A. 
Goodwill, who's office is located in the same 
building with attorneys who are the general 
counsel ~o~ the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-~a~ Saints, indicating even further 
Church climbing.) Further, the Defendant also 
thought the unholy and improper Church climbing 
might even go as high as Brother Delbert L. Stapley, 
a relative of the Plaintiff's father, and the 
man who married the parties hereto; or maybe 
even as high as Brother N. Eldon Tanner, a 
personal acquaintance of the Plaintiff's family. 
While this Church climbing is wrong and not the 
order of the Church and would not knowingly be 
condoned by any of these three good brethren, 
(two of whom are General Authorities of the 
Church), it was apparently engaged in by the 
Plaintiff and/or her parents, because the Stake 
President told the Defendant he had received 
a telephone call asking him, the Stake President, 
if he knew what was going on in his Stake. The 
Stake President added that the call was not from 
Brother Stapley, but he did not say whom the 
call was from. So the Defendant knows that, 
contrary to the order of the Church, some 
improper Church climbing had to be going on for 
anyone higher than the Stake President to have 
called down to the Stake President; and if any 
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deduction can be made from what the Stake 
President said about it not being from 
Brother Stapley, then the unholy and 
improper Church climbing went quite high 
up in the Church. 
THE DEFENDANT HAS STATED AND SET FORTH THE 
FOREGOING TO SHOW THE COURT THE KIND OF 
"ANYTHING AND EVERYTHING" THE PLAINTIFF AND 
HER FAMILY HAS PARTICIPATED IN TO CREATE AND 
INFLICT MENTAL DISTRESS, PSYCHOLOGICAL 
CRUELTY, AND EVEN PSYCHIATRIC DAMAGE UPON 
THE DEFENDANT. THE FOREGOING IS ALSO 
RELEVANT BECAUSE THE DEFENDANT BELIEVES THAT 
THIS "MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM THE FINAL DECREE 
OF DIVORCE" IS A FORM OF LEGAL HARASSMENT 
SIMILAR TO THE FOREGOING EXAMPLES OF RELIGIOUS 
HARASSMENT, ALREADY CARRIED OUT BY THE 
PLAINTIFF AND HER FAMILY. Further, they have 
always tried to inflict this type of thing 
upon the Defendant (and others as well) by 
their pseudo-religious, self-righteous, and 
very "sick family system", as the therapists 
put it. (Emphasis in the original.) 
By its quasi-finding, the trial court would 
also apparently charge Appellant with "well knowing" the statements 
in an affidavit elicited by Respondent from the teenage son of 
the parties to the effect that mother (Appellant) "lies," and 
"Grandpa Davis" (Appellant's father) was a thief. (R.428-4-34.) 
These are but a few examples illustrative of all of 
the affidavits submitted by Respondent in this case. Appellant 
points out in passing that there are several extremely grave 
defects in Respondent's "Answer and Counter-Affidavits." For 
example, all of the sub-affidavits attached thereto and found in 
the court file are copies; not one is an original. Furthermore, 
several of the copies show no sign of originally bearing a notary 
seal. The main affidavit itself was executed October 16, 1978 
while a further affidavit of Milan Mack Boyce attached thereto 
as Exhibit "E" (R.446-460) was executed on November 30, 1978. 
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The Affidavit of Craig M. Strom attached as Exhibit "K" 
(R.481-483) and the Second Affidavit of Craig Marvin Strom 
attached as Exhibit "N" (R. 490-492), bear two different 
signatures. 
A further example is found in Respondent's 
Petition to Set Aside the Temporary Order of the Court and 
to restore the Decree of Divorce Herein (R. 307-335). In said 
Petition Respondent represents that in order to borrow money 
it was necessary for him to enter into an "Agreement" with 
Zions First National Bank. Respondent attached Exhibit "E" 
(R. 322-324) as evidence of said "Agreement." That document 
was never signed by Noall J. Bennett on behalf of Zions and 
a representative of Zions was prepared to so testify on 
October 17, 1978, but was not permitted to do so because the 
hearing was terminated. 
E,·~c: c 2cusory examination of these "documents" 
reveal a presentation to the lower court almost beyond 
belief, and yet all of this was not only considered by the 
lower court but, according to its Memorandum Decision, formed 
the basis of its ruling. Not one shred of Respondent's 
"evidence" was subject to cross-examination by Appellant. The 
lower court basing its decision on said "documents" in the faci 
of direct evidence adduced in open court by Appellant 
constitutes reversible error. 
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It is respectfully submitted that the lower 
court's Memorandum Decision makes it clear that the lower 
court relied solely on the affidavits of Respondent in 
coming to its decision even though Appellant had presented 
evidence both oral and documentary in open court. For the lower 
court to have done so was prejudicial to Appellant and 
constitutes reversible error. 
CONCLUSION 
The foregoing analysis along with Appellant's Brief 
to this Honorable Court show that the lower court erred in 
refusing to grant Appellant's Motion for relief from the 
Decree of Divorce. It is respectfully submitted that this 
court should therefore reverse the lower court and order the 
lower court to set aside the Decree of Divorce and permit full 
discovery so that the full extent of the fraud perpetrated by 
Respondent can be presented, or in the alternative to require 
the trial court to permit full discovery preparatory to a 
hearing on a motion to modify the decree as it pertains to 
property distribution, child support and alimony. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BAYLE, CHILD & RITCHIE 
R. M. Child 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
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